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ABSTRACT 
 
Melissa Radke: 
European Union Influence on Violent Ethnic Conflict in Europe:  Case Studies of Northern 
Ireland, País Vasco, and FYR Macedonia 
 (Under the direction of Milada Anna Vachudova) 
 
 
Throughout history, Europe has been the site of numerous and enduring ethnic 
conflicts.  Since the mid-twentieth century, the European Union (EU) has increased both its 
size and policymaking competency, but does not have the authority to solve domestic 
conflicts in member states.  Despite this, it can still have influence on paramilitary domestic 
ethnic conflict in Europe, primarily through providing a change of context and facilitating 
cooperation between conflicting parties, and this influence is consistent with previously 
established conflict solving strategies.  However, EU influence is not uniform across member 
states, and its effectiveness will depend on the domestic context of the conflict.  The ways in 
which the EU can influence ethnic conflict in member states differ from the ways it can do so 
in candidate states.  In candidate states, the EU is more overt and applies direct pressure 
through accession conditionality, and this influence is also consistent with conflict solving 
strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Europe’s history is full of conflict – from warring tribes to competing empires and 
rival nation states and all phases in between.  Following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
the concept of the sovereign nation state has continually posed problems to Europe’s 
complex ethnic geography, oftentimes producing conflict within the borders of a single 
nation state.  Even today, conflicts between ethnic groups within single nation states persist, 
sometimes resulting in demands for increased autonomy or for secession.  Some conflicts, 
like those between the Catalans and Spain or the Scots and the United Kingdom, have a non-
violent character (at least in the modern era).  Others, however, have resulted in paramilitary 
violence.  In this thesis, I study conflicts in Europe that have arisen between a state and an 
ethnic minority that has turned to the use of paramilitary violence in its struggle. 
Since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, the European Union (EU) has grown in 
size and its competency over important areas of policymaking.  In many areas – especially 
those related to the regulation of the economy – member states have pooled their sovereignty 
in the EU’s institutions.  However, resolving domestic conflict remains squarely under the 
authority of the member states.  Nevertheless, ethnic minorities seeking greater autonomy or 
independence have called on the EU, seeing it as a potential ally against the national 
government.  I show in this thesis how and under what conditions the EU has had an impact 
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on domestic conflicts between governments and minorities.  I also explore whether the EU’s 
influence fits into existing theories about how conflicts may be mitigated or solved. 
In my analysis, I explore what influence, whether direct or indirect, the EU has had 
on domestic ethnic conflicts that specifically include nationalist paramilitary groups.  When 
scholars consider strategies for solving violent ethnic conflict, they privilege mediation and 
peace negotiations since these are the most public and well-known methods.  However, since 
this does not fall within the EU’s competence, it has not taken this role in ethnic conflicts 
within its own member states.  However, I argue that there are other ways that the EU can 
have influence on these conflicts, and, whether intended or not, this influence is consistent 
with existing theory on solving ethnic conflict.   
Overall, the EU is able to achieve two main effects through its influence:  increased 
cooperation and a change of context.  In my case studies, the EU record is mixed.  EU 
influence depends on how parties and governments use the tools and experience of European 
integration.  The EU has been able to influence both conflicting member states and ethnic 
communities to cooperate.  In member states, the EU primarily encourages cross-community 
cooperation through economic and social programs, and influences cooperation between 
member states through continued interaction at the EU level.  European integration provides 
a change of context by changing the patterns of interaction between member states and 
giving conflicting parties new issues and arenas for debate.  However, the EU has not been 
able to positively influence ethnic conflict situations in all cases.  I argue that the EU is more 
influential in member states where the ethnic minority is not only fighting the state but also 
other ethnic groups in the same area. 
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I also show that the EU can influence conflicts within candidate states more 
effectively than conflicts within member states.  After all, candidate states are subject to the 
EU’s leverage; governments that want to qualify for EU membership may be willing to have 
the EU mediate their conflict – indeed they may welcome its interference.  Once again, the 
EU is able to influence conflicting parties to cooperate towards a new goal:  EU membership.  
This new goal provides a change of context for the conflict.  Within candidate states, the EU 
takes a more overtly active role, using potential membership as tool for reform.  As in 
member states, I argue that this influence in candidate states can also fit into existing theory 
on solving ethnic conflict. 
I provide evidence for these arguments through three case studies:  the Irish in 
Northern Ireland, the Basques in Spain’s País Vasco (Basque Country), and the Albanians in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia.  I have selected these case studies 
based on three criteria:  1) There is/was an active paramilitary group that is/was largely 
considered to be a terrorist group [the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA), and the National Liberation Army (NLA), respectively].  2) This group has a 
connection, either explicit or implicit, to a political party [Sinn Féin, Batasuna, and the 
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI)].  3) There is a cross-border dimension to the 
conflict (United Kingdom-Ireland, Spain-France, and Macedonia-Albania-Kosovo).  I have 
selected these cases because of their radical nature.  In all three cases, paramilitary groups 
took action prior to the beginning of EU accession in each nation state.1                                                        
1The United Kingdom originally applied for the EU in 1961, but was unsuccessful due to French concerns over 
the UK’s political will to join.  The UK reapplied in 1967.  Ireland applied in 1967 and entered the EU in 1973 
at the same time as the UK.  This time period was also the beginning of “the Troubles” in Northern Ireland, 
although the original manifestation of the IRA predated Ireland’s independence in 1921.  Spain applied for the 
EU in 1962, but the EU never formally addressed the application over incompatibilities between Franco’s 
regime and the EU.  Spain applied once again in 1977, almost twenty years after ETA’s formation, and joined 
the EU in 1986. 
  Previous research 
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has emphasized the impact that the EU can have with political moderates in conflict areas.2
Previous research widely neglects what kind of influence the EU can have (or has 
had) on violent ethnic conflict within its current member states.  Much of the literature that 
deals with the relationship between these areas and the EU focuses on economic and social 
factors but does not tend to link them to the ethnic conflicts there.  I hope to help fill this gap 
through my Northern Ireland and Basque case studies.  The main purpose of the Macedonia 
case study is to highlight the contrast between EU efforts within member states and within 
candidate states. While the EU may be able to play a role in attenuating violent conflict in 
member and candidate states, I show that the strategies used in pursuit of this goal have 
differed. 
  
Whether or not the EU can help demobilize radical groups such as these, however, remains 
unclear.   
For each case, I sketch the EU’s direct and indirect influence.  I show its influence in 
three specific areas:  political, economic, and cross-border relations.  To measure the EU’s 
political influence, I look at EU involvement in peace negotiations, EU influence on 
nationalist parties (with special attention to those connected with the paramilitary groups), 
and the use of EU regional institutions.  To assess the EU’s economic influence, I examine 
what, if any, consequences, benefits, or incentives regarding the conflicts have arisen from 
EU economic involvement.  Lastly, I also look at how the EU has affected cross-border 
relations in each case. 
This thesis is divided into three sections.  In the first, I will detail previous literature 
relating to the EU and its influence on ethnic conflict.  Given the emphasis that is placed on                                                         
2Diez, Thomas, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter (eds) (2008) The European Union and Border Conflicts.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
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the decreasing significance of the modern nation state, the EU is often considered very 
closely connected to globalization.  Theory on the effect of globalization on ethnic conflict is 
inconclusive.  Theory that focuses on the EU in particular maintains a focus outward from 
the EU rather than inward.  The second section introduces existing conflict solving strategies 
with reference to the understanding of the causes of ethnic conflict that produce these 
strategies.  Also in this section, I detail how EU action can fit in with this framework by 
identifying what specific aspects of conflict solving strategy I examine in my political, 
economic, and cross-border dimensions.  In the final section, I turn to the case studies of EU 
influence in Northern Ireland, País Vasco, and Macedonia. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
THE EU:  A CATALYST OR DETERRENT FOR ETHNIC CONFLICT? 
 
Previous literature on globalization and European integration is not conclusive when 
it comes to assessing the EU’s effect on ethnic conflict in general.  There exist many very 
diverse arguments about whether and how globalization impacts ethnic conflict.  Scholars 
argue that globalization increases ethnic conflict,3 helps mitigate it,4 or has little effect on it 
at all.5  For its part, the EU is considered “intimately related” to the process of globalization, 
“part and parcel of an age that renders strict territorial delineations and borders obsolete.”6
                                                        
3Lobell, Steven E. and Philip Mauceri (2004) “Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict” in Ethnic Conflict 
and International Politics:  Explaining Diffusion and Escalation, edited by Steven E. Lobell and Philip 
Mauceri.  New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 1-9; 7-8.; Muller, Jerry Z. (2008) “Us and Them:  The Enduring 
Power of Ethnic Nationalism.” Foreign Affairs 87(2):  18-35. 
  
All three conflicts that I examine have roots that trace farther back in time than the onset of 
what we consider globalization, so it cannot be argued that globalization has served as their 
catalyst.  However, since each situation – whether a peace agreement is in place or not – 
remains extremely sensitive, globalization has apparently not made concerns about territory 
or autonomy less relevant. 
 
4Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur Stein (2008) “Separatism’s Final Country” in “Responses:  Is Ethnic Conflict 
Inevitable:  Parting Ways over Nationalism and Separatism.”  Foreign Affairs 87(3):  141-145; 143; Sadowski, 
Yahya (1998) “Ethnic conflict.”  Foreign Policy 111:  12-23; 20. 
 
5Esman, Milton J. (2004) An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict.  Cambridge:  Polity; 23-25. 
 
6Diez, Albert, and Stetter, 149-150. 
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Research related to European integration and ethnic conflict has several common 
themes.  Many agree that European integration has contributed to what some call the 
resurgence of regional identities.7  Globalization and integration have made it “no longer 
possible to study territorial politics without taking full account of activities, policies, 
decisions and relationships beyond the state.”8  One result of this resurgence of regions is a 
number of EU-level regional organizations and mechanisms.9  However, regional 
mobilization has not been uniform across Europe.  Some regional groups fear that the 
development of regions will lead to a loss of competency over issues that used to be part of 
their jurisdiction.  Others seek to use the EU as a source of political and economic resources, 
possibly also as a new arena to express their nationalist aspirations.10  Thus far, studies have 
shown that even though the EU can empower regional governments, it has not had this effect 
universally across the EU.11  Despite this, others have argued that regionalist political parties 
remain consistently pro-EU,12
                                                        
7Paasi, Anssi (2009) “The resurgence of the ‘Region’ and ‘Regional Identity’:  theoretical perspectives and 
empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe.”  Review of International Studies 35:  121-146; 145. 
 possibly indicating their faith in (or aspirations for) EU-level 
regional outlets. 
 
8Bourne, Angela K. (2003) “Introduction:  The Domestic Politics of Regionalism and European Integration.”  
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 4(3):  347-362; 349. 
 
9Ibid., 349-350. 
 
10Keating, Michael and Liesbet Hooghe (1996) “By-passing the nation state?  Regions and the EU policy 
process” in European Union:  power and policy-making, edited by Jeremy J. Richardson.  London:  Routledge; 
217-218. 
 
11Marks, Gary, François Nielsen, Leonard Ray, and Jane E. Salk (1996) “Competencies, Cracks, and Conflicts:  
Regional Mobilization in the European Union.”  Comparative Political Studies 29(2):  164-192; 189. 
 
12Jolly, Seth Kincaid. (2007) “The Europhile Fringe?:  Regionalist Party Support for European Integration.”  
European Union Politics 8(1):  109-130; 124. 
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Studies of EU involvement in dealing with ethnic conflict thus far have primarily 
focused on conflicts taking place outside of the EU.13  Taking European integration as a 
microcosm for globalization, Anamaria Dutceac argues that the EU promotes a value system 
based on democracy and tolerance, thus creating an environment for ethnic coexistence.14  
Similarly, Zsuzsa Csergo and James Goldgeier argue that the EU provides a framework for 
nation building that can incorporate conflicting nationalisms and make instability less 
likely.15
Of the few who have looked at EU influence on ethnic conflict resolution within EU 
member states,
  However, both research projects focused outward from the EU, concentrating on the 
process of EU accession.  It remains unclear whether the EU would have the same, if any, 
effect on current EU members.   
16
                                                        
13For examples, see the following:  Cameron, Fraser and Rosa Balfour (2006) “The European Neighborhood 
Policy as a conflict prevention tool.”  EPC Issue Paper No. 47.  <http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/ 
documents/thematic_issues/prevention_tool___epc_issue_paper_47.pdf>; Eralp, Doga Ulas and Nimet Beriker 
(2005) “Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU:  The Cyprus Conflict and EU Accession 
Negotiations.”  Security Dialogue 36(2):  175-192; Tocci, Nathalie (2004) “EU Intervention in Ethno-political 
Conflicts:  The Cases of Cyprus and Serbia-Montenegro.”  European Foreign Affairs Review 9(4):  551-573; 
Tocci, Nathalie (2008) “The EU and Conflict Resolution in Turkey and Georgia:  Hindering EU Potential 
Through the Political Management of Contractual Relations.”  Journal of Common Market Studies 46(4):  875-
897; Van Houten, Pieter and Stefan Wolff (2008) “The Dynamics of Ethnopolitical Conflict Management by 
International Regional Organizations in Europe.” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 
1/2008.  <http://www.ecmi.de/ jemie/download/1-2008-Houten_Wolff.pdf>. 
 none have attempted to explore whether or not EU influence fits in with 
established ethnic conflict solving theory, which will be detailed in the next section.  Thomas 
Diez, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter’s volume examines pathways for EU influence in 
“border conflicts,” achieved through European integration.  The island of Ireland serves as 
 
14Dutceac, Anamaria (2004) “Globalization and Ethnic Conflict:  Beyond the Liberal-Nationalist Distinction.” 
The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 3(2):  20-39. 
 
15Csergo, Zsuzsa and James M. Goldgeier (2004) “Nationalist Strategies and European Integration.”  
Perspectives on Politics 2(1):  21-37. 
 
16See Bourne, Angela K. (2004) “European Integration and Conflict Resolution in the Basque Country, 
Northern Ireland, and Cyprus” in The EU and Territorial Politics within Member States:  Conflict or Co-
operation?, edited by Angela K. Bourne.  Leiden:  Brill; Diez, Albert, and Stetter. 
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one of their case studies, but the volume focuses strictly on conflict transformation and 
neglects other forms of conflict solving strategy.  Even though the volume specifies four 
paths for EU influence (compulsory, enabling, connective, and constructive), it fails to 
satisfactorily connect the authors’ own categories, and thus EU influence, to existing 
literature on conflict solving.  Bourne’s article is similar; while she reveals important ways 
that the EU has influence in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and Cyprus, she fails to 
connect this to existing literature.  My analysis not only shows the ways the EU has affected 
each case study, but also explicitly evaluates EU influence based on previous literature on 
solving ethnic conflict. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
CONFLICT SOLVING STRATEGIES AND THE EU’S POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCE 
 
Theories on how to deal with ethnic conflict generally fall into three categories – 
conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation – with some overlap 
between them.  Different understandings of the causes of ethnic conflicts result in different 
strategies for solving them.  These categories will now be described in turn, followed by an 
explanation of how EU influence fits into each of them. 
 
DEALING WITH ETHNIC CONFLICT 
 Conflict management strategies arise from a subjectivist or pluralist understanding of 
ethnic conflict as the consequence of incompatible values, goals, and interests.  This 
incompatibility is deep-seeded and unaffected by education, secularization, and 
modernization.  Manipulative elites and identity politics only make this perceived 
incompatibility worse.17  As such, proponents of conflict management believe that conflict 
can only be managed and contained, not eliminated.18  These strategies are largely outcome-
oriented and do not tend to address the root causes of the conflict.19
                                                        
17Horowitz, Donald L. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict.  Berkeley:  University of California Press; 135-140; 
Oberschall, Anthony (2007) Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies:  Responses to ethnic violence.  
Abingdon:  Routledge; 11-12. 
  Conflict management is 
 
18Miall, 3. 
 
19Reimann, 8. 
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most often achieved through negotiation.  Negotiations involve a calculation of interests and 
working together toward some mutually profitable goal.20
 The conflict resolution approach focuses on the unsatisfied needs of conflicting 
groups.  According to objectivist or modernization theory on the causes of ethnic conflict, 
these unsatisfied needs come from increased contact and thus increased competition between 
groups.
 
21  Once again, manipulative elites and identity politics can play a role in fostering 
poor relations between groups.22  Conflict resolution is a process-oriented approach aimed at 
addressing the root causes of the conflict.  Conflict resolution strategies attempt to reframe 
conflict as a “shared problem with mutually acceptable solutions.”23  Conflicting parties are 
encouraged to work together to satisfy mutual needs, possibly reevaluating their interests in 
the process.24  These strategies often include intervention by “skilled but powerless” third 
parties working to help conflicting parties reevaluate their positions and interests.25
 Conflict transformation strategies spring from a mixed understanding of the causes of 
ethnic conflicts.  They combine the attention that subjectivists draw to isolation between 
groups and the facility of system domination with the objectivist idea that conflicting groups 
can find shared goals and needs.
  These 
strategies, however, do not necessarily reduce the power of manipulative elites. 
26
                                                        
20Ross, Marc Howard (2000) “Creating the conditions for peacemaking:  theories of practice in ethnic conflict 
resolution.”  Ethnic and Racial Studies 23(6):  1002-1034; 1011-1013. 
  Yet again, manipulative elites and identity politics can fan 
 
21Horowitz, 97-135, 139-140. 
 
22Oberschall, 11-12. 
 
23Reimann, 9. 
 
24Ross, 1013-1014. 
 
25Miall, 3. 
 
26Horowitz, 139-140. 
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the fires.27  Conflict transformation strategies are outcome-, structure-, and process-oriented 
and strive to develop constructive relationships between actors of unequal status.28  
Community relations are strengthened through the recognition and empowerment of 
marginalized groups.29  Transformations can take place on multiple levels:  context, 
structure, actor, issue, and personal/elite.30
 
  Since these strategies can empower the 
grassroots, conflict transformation is the only group of strategies out of these three that can 
dislodge manipulative elites and reduce the salience of identity politics. 
POTENTIAL FOR EU INFLUENCE ON ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE 
What are the likely pathways for EU influence?  I argue that there are three general 
dimensions in which the EU can play a role in ethnic conflict, both inside and outside of the 
EU:  political, economic, and cross-border relations.  Elements of the conflict solving 
strategies described above can fit into each of these dimensions, as I explain below when I 
evaluate each dimension of influence.  Even though I draw a distinction between these three 
dimensions, they are not exclusive to each other.  For example, economic actions could 
potentially have political effects.  I argue that EU actions within these categories can use 
similar methods and achieve similar effects as traditional conflict settlement approaches.  
However, I understand that the EU could potentially have a detrimental effect within each 
category. 
                                                        
27Oberschall, 11-12. 
 
28Reimann, 10. 
 
29Ross, 1009-1011. 
 
30Miall, 10. 
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Within the political dimension, I look at three channels of influence.  The first is EU 
participation in or influence on peace processes or negotiations.  Does the EU act as a 
“powerless” third party?  If so, is it really a “powerless” party?  If it hasn’t directly mediated, 
how has it affected negotiations?  Secondly, I look at what kind of influence the EU has had 
on the nationalist parties in question.  Has EU integration (or accession) contributed to 
conflict resolution by causing these parties to reevaluate their interests?  Has integration 
helped them to fulfill their needs?  Lastly, I look at what impact EU regional mechanisms 
and tools have on the particular conflicts.  I specifically evaluate whether EU regional and 
minority rights mechanisms can “empower the marginalized,” encourage cross-community 
cooperation, or help to meet the needs of the ethnic groups in question. 
My analysis of the economic dimension is two-fold.  I examine how EU membership 
or accession has affected the general economic situation for each case study.  Additionally, I 
evaluate the effect of any specific economic assistance or funding directly related to conflict 
outcomes.  In this analysis, I hope to evaluate two things.  First, has economic influence 
resulted in a change in context along the lines of conflict transformation literature?  Second, 
has economic influence helped to satisfy conflicting groups’ needs or has it created more 
competition between them? 
The cross-border relations dimension is also two-fold.  Here, I look at how European 
integration has affected both cooperation between the governments in question and co-ethnic 
connections across borders.  Once again, European integration could affect the conflict by 
changing the context of these relationships and prompting a reevaluation of interests.
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDIES OF EU INFLUENCE ON VIOLENT DOMESTIC ETHNIC CONFLICT 
  
I will now turn to my case studies.  I first examine the conflict in Northern Ireland, 
then in País Vasco, and finally, in FYR Macedonia.  I evaluate EU influence in each case 
study along the three dimensions described above, relating this influence to the three 
strategies of conflict solving. 
 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
 In this case study, I evaluate EU influence on the conflict in Northern Ireland.  I begin 
with a discussion of the peace process before turning to EU influence on the situation gained 
through the experience of integration.  After this, I evaluate EU regional mechanisms, 
economic assistance, and cross-border initiatives with respect to the conflict.  Finally, I 
examine how the EU has influenced the political parties of Northern Ireland, with particular 
attention paid to Sinn Féin, the nationalist political party with alleged ties to the IRA. 
The peace process in Northern Ireland was tumultuous to say the least.  For a long 
time, unionists like Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) leader Ian Paisley would not even 
agree to meet with Sinn Féin because of its alleged ties to the paramilitary organization 
known as the IRA.  However, many parties, both nationalist and unionist, realized that a 
15 
workable solution would not be possible without the agreement of Sinn Féin and the IRA.31  
After previous agreements, declarations, and failed attempts at negotiation, success finally 
came in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.  The Good Friday Agreement established a 
power-sharing structure for Northern Ireland’s government and facilitated cooperation 
between Northern Ireland and London, Northern Ireland and Dublin, and London and 
Dublin.32  Although there have been some problems which resulted in the suspension of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly on a number of occasions,33 the substance of the Agreement has 
remained unchanged and both sides have continued to negotiate on other matters, albeit with 
difficulty.34
                                                        
31Indeed this close tie once existed, evidenced by prominent Irish republican Danny Morrison’s famous phrase 
of pursuing republican goals via “the Armalite and the ballot box” [see Taylor, Peter (1997) Behind the Mask:  
The IRA and Sinn Féin.  New York:  TV Books; 327].  After the split between the Official IRA and the 
Provisional IRA, Sinn Féin was often considered as the political arm of the PIRA.  During the 1970s, Bobby 
Sands, an IRA member imprisoned in Long Kesh prison (who later died during a hunger strike), won the 1981 
Fermanagh-South Tyrone by-election, held as a result of the incumbent’s death.  Sands did not run on an 
official Sinn Féin ticket, but he was initially nominated to run by Sinn Féin members.  This is really when the 
IRA began to work politically through Sinn Féin [see Moloney, Ed (2002) A Secret History of the IRA.  New 
York:  W.W. Norton; 210-214, and Coogan, Tim Pat (1997) The Troubles:  Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1996 and 
the Search for Peace.  Boulder:  Roberts Reinehart Publishers; 234-239].  Because of the inherent connection, 
during any negotiation process, Sinn Féin would often be punished as a result of IRA actions.  At the same time, 
the IRA would also frequently act in direct defiance to Sinn Féin when it undertook any actions the IRA 
disliked.  By the time of the final peace process, however, Sinn Féin had begun to distance itself from the IRA, 
which will be detailed later in this paper. 
  Implementation is also complicated because of the splits that have occurred 
within the IRA, some of them resulting from the Good Friday Agreement itself.  The leaders 
of the Provisional IRA agreed to disarm following the Good Friday Agreement.  The leaders 
of the Continuity IRA, Real IRA, and other paramilitary groups (including loyalist 
32MacGinty, Roger and John Darby (2002) Guns and Government:  The Management of the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process.  Basingstoke:  Palgrave; 41. 
 
33BBC News (2002) “Assembly suspended over ‘loss of trust,’” 14 October.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_ 
news/northern_ireland/2325833.stm>. 
 
34CNN (2010) “Leaders hail deal to save Northern Ireland power-sharing agreement,” 5 February. <http:// 
edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/02/05/northern.ireland.politics/>. 
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paramilitary groups) were not part of the negotiations, did not all agree to disarm, and many 
have remained active.35
The EU had limited direct involvement in the actual negotiation of the Northern 
Ireland peace process.  There were no EU representatives present to help with mediation or 
advise the negotiating parties in the process.
 
36  Historically, British Governments insisted 
that Northern Ireland was an internal UK problem, and therefore outside of the jurisdiction of 
what was at that time the European Community.  The European Commission and the 
European Council were happy to keep their distance, choosing to be supportive of any 
existing cooperation between the UK and Ireland on the matter and encouraging further 
cooperation.37  In fact, before membership in the EU, Ireland opposed European involvement 
because of fear that any nationalist backlash in Northern Ireland would affect Ireland’s EU 
candidacy.  During the formal accession negotiations for both Ireland and the UK, the 
conflict in Northern Ireland was not directly mentioned at all, but Ireland did see European 
integration as a possible route to Irish reunification.38
                                                        
35MacGinty and Darby, 104-105; Moloney, 72, 289, 479.  For details of the Real IRA’s and Continuity IRA’s 
recent activity, see BBC News (2009a) “‘Real IRA was behind army attack,” 8 March.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/uk_ news/northern_ireland/7930995.stm> and BBC News (2009b) “Continuity IRA shot dead officer,” 10 
March.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7934426.stm>. 
  Violence between nationalist and 
paramilitary groups began to escalate around the same time as accession occurred.  Within 
the peace process itself, the United States proved to be more directly influential than the EU.  
Former US Senator George Mitchell chaired the peace negotiations, and the Clinton 
 
36Kellas, James G. (2004) Nationalist Politics in Europe:  The Constitutional and Electoral Dimensions.  
Basingstoke:  Palgrave MacMillan; 29. 
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administration’s attention made the US the guarantor of the peace process.  This enabled 
Sinn Féin to convince the IRA that if the British reneged, they would face substantial 
pressure from the US.39
This does not mean, however, that the EU completely ignored the conflict.  In 1978, 
the Council created three European Parliament (EP) seats for Northern Ireland, a 
disproportionate number compared to the rest of the UK, widely understood as a way to give 
nationalists a voice in the EP.
  As far as the negotiations are concerned, it seems that the US – and 
not the EU – fulfilled the role of “powerless” third party.  In this case, the EU has clearly not 
fulfilled a traditional conflict management role.  It was not directly involved in negotiations 
and did not work from the assumption that unionist and nationalist values or interests were 
fundamentally incompatible.   
40  During the 1980s, the EP took a growing interest in the 
conflict, attempting to act as a moral or political conscience of the EU, and held the first 
conflict-related debate on the 1981 hunger strike.  In 1982, at the behest of John Hume, 
Member of European Parliament (MEP) from Northern Ireland’s nationalist Social 
Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), the EP established a fact-finding body to investigate 
the conflict, culminating in the Haagerup Report.41
                                                        
39Irvin, 193. 
  In the report, the EP perceived the 
conflict as one between British and Irish identity.  It also admitted that the EU’s only 
competence in Northern Ireland was economic and social, not constitutional, so it could not 
step in and demand constitutional reform.  Despite this, the Haagerup Report was believed 
 
40Giving nationalists a public voice was considered extremely important.  For a majority of the years from 1972 
to 1998, the UK government instituted “direct rule” in Northern Ireland, meaning that Northern Ireland was 
ruled directly from Westminster, and the people of Northern Ireland had no input in choosing the individuals 
that administered Northern Irish affairs.  Since the UK government more often than not sided with the unionists, 
nationalists had virtually no voice in how Northern Ireland was governed.  
 
41Ruane and Todd, 281-282. 
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influential in leading the UK to adopt the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.42  The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement provided a role for Ireland in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.  Many 
perceive both the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, along 
with the communication and institutions they established, to be modeled on the institutional 
framework of European integration.43   Both of these documents, as well as the 1993 
Downing Street Declaration44 and the 1995 Framework Documents,45 stressed their common 
membership in the EU.46
Defining Northern Ireland as a European region remains difficult.  Ireland has no 
officially recognized distinct regions, although at least six different representations of Irish 
regions exist.  The UK, on the other hand, does have officially recognized regions, Northern 
Ireland commonly being one of them.  For the Irish, membership in the EU has helped to 
create the connections to Northern Ireland that it sought, acknowledging “common interests 
but cultural and political diversity on the island in a way that gives greater strength and 
meaning to the concept of a united Irish nation and bypassing the zero-sum debate about its 
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44The Downing Street Declaration, a joint declaration from the British and Irish governments, reaffirmed the 
right to self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland.  Should a majority vote to unite Northern Ireland 
to Ireland, this document ensured that the UK would not object.  The document also opened the door for 
negotiations with parties linked to paramilitary groups (basically, with Sinn Féin), provided that they distance 
themselves from paramilitary activities. 
 
45The Framework Documents, consisting of “A New Framework for Agreement” and “A Framework for 
Accountable Government in Northern Ireland,” committed the Irish and British governments to a framework for 
continued negotiation among Northern Ireland’s political parties and laid out potential solutions to the conflict. 
 
46Hayward, Katy and Anjte Wiener (2008) “The influence of the EU towards conflict transformation on the 
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Stephan Stetter.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press; 41. 
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political configuration.”47  However, the UK prefers to think of Northern Ireland as a region 
of the UK, not as a European region.  The British government acknowledges internal 
diversity, but argues that the interests of all of its regions can be fulfilled and made stronger 
through unity with each other.48  Despite this confusion, there has been some support for a 
regional approach.  After dissatisfaction with the UK delegation in Brussels both nationalists 
and unionists demanded a more distinct Northern Irish role at the EU level.  However, these 
demands have also been coupled with differing conceptions as to what this role should be.49  
As a whole, Northern Ireland enjoys much less internal unity than many other European 
regions.  Since European regions that have a high level of internal cohesion are more likely 
to successfully mobilize at the EU level,50 this disunity may be another key reason as to why 
Northern Ireland has not been able to do so.  In 2001, the Northern Ireland Executive 
established an office in Brussels, but due to the devolved nature of British government, this 
office operates as part of the UK Permanent Representation to the EU.51
EU influence on the conflict in Northern Ireland has more often taken an indirect 
form.  During the 1970s and 1980s, although the tools the EU had at its disposal with respect 
to the conflict were limited, structural funds were a primary way for it to have influence.  The 
   As such, it does not 
seem to function with much independence from the UK delegation. 
                                                        
47Hayward, Katy (2003) “The Region between State and Nation:  British and Irish conceptions of Northern 
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48Hayward, 422-424, 438. 
 
49Ruane and Todd, 287. 
 
50Marks et al, 189. 
 
51Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (2005) “The Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in 
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fact that EU influence was and remains partly economic is no surprise, since the EU’s initial 
focus was economic integration.   
The Commission established the Special Support Programme for Peace and 
Reconciliation in response to the 1994 ceasefires.  The EU hoped that this program would 
provide incentive to resolve the conflict by addressing unemployment and economic 
underdevelopment that resulted from long-lasting conflict. 52  From 1995 to 2006, the EU 
contributed £640 million to Northern Ireland through the PEACE program.53  EU funding 
has established a number of community projects that stress communication and cooperation 
between ethnic communities.54  The PEACE program was intended to empower civil society 
by using bottom-up delivery mechanisms rather than top-down distribution.  However, the 
program strategy lacked an understanding of conflict management and the importance of 
cross-community initiatives, and suffered as a result.  The second round of funding sought to 
correct this flaw.  Today, the EU “has ﬁnally graduated Northern Ireland from the [PEACE 
program] and has imposed explicit economically defined priorities lifted from the Lisbon 
Agenda for future EU funding.”55
Other than the PEACE program, the other primary economic tool the EU has 
employed in Northern Ireland is INTERREG, the EU’s program for Europe’s borderlands.  
INTERREG provides funding throughout the EU for programs that promote cooperation 
between territorial units, often across the borders of two or more member states.  All political 
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parties in Northern Ireland welcome the economic benefits INTERREG creates.  The 
nationalist parties praise the cross-border cooperation, but all political parties except the 
SDLP have reservations about INTERREG’s political implications.  Like the PEACE 
program, INTERREG has had some problems.  INTERREG I and II were largely centralized 
programs, allowing for little local involvement or consultation, but this was changed in 
INTERREG III.  Despite the problems in INTERREG I and II, EU funding was still critical 
to the development of grassroots cross-border networks, making them strong enough to 
demand a larger role in INTERREG III.  The cross-border partnerships that INTERREG has 
helped to forge have enabled cooperation for mutual benefit and have created connections 
between elites and social partners on both sides of the Ireland-Northern Ireland border.  EU 
involvement in Northern Ireland through the INTERREG program has given the EU 
additional influence there and altered the domestic situation to favor cross-border economic 
networks.  Unionists, however, still stress that economic cooperation remains secondary to 
political concerns and worry that increased cross-border cooperation is a Trojan horse 
leading to Irish reunification.  On the nationalist side, the SDLP argues that EU-facilitated 
cooperation helps to foster reconciliation.56  Sinn Féin welcomes the cross-border 
cooperation and recognizes the impact of EU funding but remains less enthusiastic about 
European integration in general.57
By providing funding to civil society groups and cross-community initiatives, some 
argue that the EU was able help transform the nationalists’ politics “from protest to 
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participation and lobbying.”58  Others have also argued that economic assistance could 
contribute to the decreasing amount of lobbying for the unification of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland, even though unionists worry to the contrary.  This could be the case for two reasons.  
First, as noted above, European integration and the establishment of cross-border networks 
may make reunification less necessary or likely economically.  Second, up until the current 
financial crisis, membership in the EU has significantly improved the Irish economy.  In the 
eyes of some, this has raised concern over uniting a more successful Ireland to a generally 
economically depressed Northern Ireland.59  However, others also argue that integration can 
further encourage calls for Irish unity.60  Still others argue that those who receive EU funds 
are acutely aware of their origin and that there may be a connection to a decrease in the level 
of sectarian violence in these areas.  The EU funds in Northern Ireland are perceived as 
building a strong culture of partnership and peace building.  Additionally, the EU’s emphasis 
on economic rights, non-discrimination, and social inclusion has mediated previous levels of 
economic discrimination in Northern Ireland.61  However, it has been noted that concerning 
the outside flow of funding, “the flow from membership in the EU has always been a modest 
fraction of that resulting from membership in the United Kingdom.”62
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  Overall – with the 
exception of the SDLP, which fully supports European integration – politicians welcome 
European funding and recognize what it has achieved, but have differing reservations about 
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the wider implications of European integration.  Public opinion on the EU and its economic 
assistance seems to depend on whether or not individuals have benefitted from it personally. 
Through the funding described above, the EU has helped to improve the prospects for 
solving ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland.  From the conflict resolution strand, the EU has 
helped to satisfy the economic needs in Northern Ireland and the Irish borderlands.  A 
stronger economy – a growing economic pie – has significantly lessened competition 
between unionists and nationalists in this area.  From the conflict transformation strand, the 
EU, through its emphasis on economic rights and non-discrimination, has helped to empower 
nationalists who had previously been subject to economic discrimination.  Additionally, the 
INTERREG program has established connections between elites and cross-border and cross-
community civil society networks, transforming a previously hostile atmosphere to one of 
cooperation. 
In addition to the cross-border relationships established in INTERREG, another 
common argument concerning the EU’s indirect influence is that the mutual membership of 
Ireland and the UK in the EU has facilitated cooperation that was previously unthinkable.  
Prior to their inclusion in the EU, the UK and Ireland had a mutually resentful relationship.63  
By creating formal equality between Ireland and the UK, mutual involvement in the EU 
prepared both countries to negotiate and work together on solving the conflict.64  Their 
cooperation essentially reduced the number of conflicting parties from six to four.65
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  This 
plays directly into the conflict resolution and conflict transformation literature.  Cooperation 
at the European level was influential in helping the UK and Ireland recognize the situation in 
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Northern Ireland as a shared problem.  In addition to establishing a constructive rather than 
hostile relationship between Ireland and the UK, European integration transformed the 
context in which the Northern Ireland conflict occurred. 
This argument, however, is not one that has just arisen in hindsight, trying to establish 
an EU role where it was previously assumed that there was not one.  Even at the time, it was 
argued that the EU was not only providing economic assistance, but was also “offering 
benefits and imposing penalties that have swayed the attitudes and behaviors of the parties to 
the conflict.”66  The Irish and British governments themselves acknowledge the positive 
influence of mutual EU membership on their ability to embrace a common agenda and 
achieve common objectives on this matter.67  The EU played a role in “legitimizing the 
redefinition of Ireland as a single island” without encroaching either Irish or British 
sovereignty.  This development at the EU level allowed the UK and Ireland to discuss the 
issue and paved the way for the Anglo-Irish Agreement.68  Others do not deny this role, but 
have downplayed it somewhat, arguing for the influence of the US, the progression of the 
conflict, and continuing UK state contraction and decolonization as additional contributing 
factors.69
Did the EU have any role in Sinn Féin’s decision to distance itself from the IRA and 
to attempt to solve the conflict through non-violent means?  There is actually very little 
conclusive evidence for this claim.  There truly is no consensus as to what key factors led to 
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Sinn Féin’s shift away from IRA militarism.70  Throughout the peace process, Sinn Féin was 
excluded from negotiations as a result of actions of IRA activities, so the party stood to gain 
considerably by distancing itself from the movement.  However, they also risked alienating 
some (albeit a minority of) nationalists by doing so.  Despite the fact that Sinn Féin has 
overtaken the SDLP as the most popular nationalist party in Northern Ireland, the calls for 
sanctions on Sinn Féin in response to the IRA bank robbery and the murder of Robert 
McCartney in 2005 showed that, at least in the minds of many, the party was still connected 
to the IRA.71  But this connection seems to have eroded further in response to the recent 
activity of the Continuity IRA and Real IRA, evinced by the comments of prominent Sinn 
Féin (and former IRA) members Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, who was believed to 
be a former member of the IRA’s Army Council.72
What seems to be more certain is that it was not likely that EU involvement played a 
dominant role in Sinn Féin’s decision, but may still have a part to play.  Unlike the SDLP, 
  In short, Sinn Féin’s strategy of 
distancing itself from the IRA seems to have more to do with being electorally viable and 
gaining domestic political legitimacy than from any external pressure or influence.  In truth, 
however, other than public statements, there is also no concrete evidence of whether or not 
Sinn Féin has completely detached itself from activities of the IRA, but it has certainly kept 
up the public appearance that it has done so. 
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who from the very beginning of accession negotiations supported European integration,73 
Sinn Féin, until recently, was vehemently opposed to it.  Overall, the party views European 
integration as an erosion of sovereignty and Irish neutrality and as another way for the UK to 
gain an upper hand on Ireland.  European integration did not cause Sinn Féin to distance 
itself from the IRA, but it has been used as a tool for it to do so.  Although Sinn Féin remains 
critical of many aspects of European integration, in the 1980s it began to see EP elections as 
a way to boost the party’s credibility as an “all-Ireland” party and to maintain the level of 
activism between local elections.74  Also despite its criticism, in the early 1990s, Sinn Féin 
was not hesitant to appeal to an EU human rights monitoring group, insisting that British 
involvement in Ireland was “a European issue.”75
Because of the popularity of European integration in Ireland as opposed to the UK, 
reevaluation of Sinn Féin’s views on integration had the potential to expand the party’s 
popularity in Ireland itself.
   
76  Irish levels of support for European integration and recognition 
of the benefits of EU membership are significantly higher than levels in the UK.77
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  In 
general, Northern Irish public opinion on the EU tends to be a bit more optimistic compared 
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to the rest of the UK,78
Despite the fact that issues related to the conflict still arise today, Sinn Féin needed a 
new issue on which to concentrate following the Good Friday Agreement.  The party began 
to use European integration and related issues as its new battlefield, once again using 
European issues to test all-Ireland programs and emphasizing the EU values of equality, 
justice, and freedom.  In 2004, the first Sinn Féin MEPs were elected into the EP, one from 
Ireland and one from Northern Ireland.
 but still short of the levels of support in Ireland, and most political 
parties in Northern Ireland maintain a Euroskeptic stance.   
79  Today, Sinn Féin is the only party in the Republic 
of Ireland that openly and critically questions European integration.80  Overall, Sinn Féin 
seems to accept the inevitability of European integration but has used it as a way to continue 
its nationalism and distance itself from its violent past.  Indeed, a major effect of European 
integration in Northern Ireland has been to create a new arena for conflict.  Views on the EU 
are integrated into parties’ ideologies and EP elections are most commonly fought over local 
issues.81
As far as political parties in the conflict are concerned, the major contribution of the 
EU is a change of context.  Whether or not this has helped to transform the conflict in a 
positive way remains unclear.  Most parties in Northern Ireland remain skeptical over 
European integration, albeit for different reasons.  Out of the nationalist and unionist parties 
of Northern Ireland, the SDLP is the only party to fully embrace European integration.  The 
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rest are primarily Euroskeptic, attempting to gain what benefits they can out of the EU for 
their voters, but remaining critical of European integration overall.82
Overall, the EU has been able to influence the conflict in Northern Ireland in ways 
consistent with conflict solving literature.  Through structural funding, the EU has helped to 
fulfill economic needs, allowing focus to shift to other issues, and has helped reduce 
economic discrimination.  EU influence has also helped establish and maintain more 
cooperative cross-community relationships, as well as a constructive relationship between 
Ireland and the UK.  European integration has provided a change of context for all political 
parties involved, and provides Sinn Féin in particular another chance to forge a new political 
identity, both in Northern Ireland and Ireland.  
  What is more common 
is that these parties see the EU and its institutions as another arena in which to engage each 
other, primarily using the EU to further their domestic interests.  Prior to the Good Friday 
Agreement, participation at the European level could give nationalists voice that they lacked 
in the governing of Northern Ireland.  After gaining equal participation in Northern Ireland, 
the European outlet seems to have declined in significance. 
  
PAÍS VASCO 
The peace process between Spain and ETA in the Basque Country has been equally 
as tumultuous and has overall produced few tangible results compared to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland.  In my case study on the Basque conflict I will first sketch the relationship 
between the Basque groups and the Spanish government – and describe the many Basque 
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nationalist groups that are part of the conflict.  Next, I analyze how the EU may have an 
indirect role in shaping this conflict.  I examine the effect of integration on the conflict, 
including the use of regional mechanisms and how integration affects the nationalist 
movement, and analyze EU economic efforts and cross-border influence.  
Negotiations between the Spanish government and the Basques are made more 
difficult by Basque challenges to Spanish authority.  Basque parties encouraged their voters 
to abstain from voting on the 1978 Spanish constitution, and 54.5% of the electorate 
abstained.  Consequently, from the perspective of the Basque government, Spain should have 
no authority there since a majority of total eligible voters did not pass the referendum.  
Additionally, although 53% of those who voted did so in favor of the Statute of Autonomy, 
41% also abstained from that vote.83
The Spanish government first publicly acknowledged that a negotiated settlement was 
a possibility in the late 1980s.
  The Statute of Autonomy establishes the competencies 
of Spain’s seventeen autonomous communities, including a high level of legislative and 
executive autonomy.  The Basque Country and neighboring Navarra enjoy a particularly high 
level of self-government – widely considered the highest of any non-state entity in the EU. 
84  Negotiations had occurred previously, but largely out of the 
view of the public.85
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  As with Northern Ireland, the nature of these negotiations was 
constantly changing due to the debate over whether Spain should be negotiating with ETA, a 
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terrorist group, or political entities believed to be connected to it.86  The most recent ETA 
ceasefire, declared in March 2006, purportedly a “permanent ceasefire,” was ended with a 
bombing in Madrid in 2006,87 and was officially declared to be over in June 2007.88  
Following this collapse, Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero vowed that no negotiations would 
take place as long as violence continues.89  Like the Northern Ireland process, the EU has had 
very little direct involvement in any negotiations or ceasefires.  A major difference in this 
case is that it explicitly refused to take a leading role in negotiation when Basque separatists 
urged them to do so.90  Throughout the conflict, however, the EU has remained supportive of 
Basque self-government.91
While the paramilitary side is quite unified, the nationalist political environment in 
the Basque Country is more fragmented than in Northern Ireland.  There, the SDLP and Sinn 
Féin dominate the nationalist movement and were never part of a unified nationalist group.  
In the Basque Country, however, there are numerous nationalist parties, most of which split 
off from the Partido Nationalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV) at various points in 
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the movement and for various reasons.92  Since accession to the EU, all parties have a 
European component to their platforms, some displaying visions of independence or status 
equal to EU member states.  Over time, the nationalist parties have become more and more 
divided over end goals (increased autonomy v. secession) and tactics (violent v. non-
violent).93
The PNV has historically been supportive of European integration, largely because of 
the economic benefit derived from it and the EU support for preserving minority cultures and 
languages and Basque self-government.
   
94  Until 1999, the PNV was aligned with the 
European People’s Party (Christian Democratic coalition) at the European level, but has 
increasingly moved toward the GRN/Green Group-European Free Alliance.  In 2000, the 
Christian Democratic International expelled the PNV from its membership.  This essentially 
isolated them from the European mainstream and has contributed to decreasing legitimacy 
for the Basque struggle within the EU.95
Batasuna (Unity) is the party most closely associated with ETA, emerging from the 
PNV after the Spanish constitution of 1978.
   
96  Other parties like Euskal Ezkerra (Basque 
Left, EuE) began by breaking off from ETA and renouncing violence, but Batasuna remains 
the only party with concrete ties to ETA.97                                                        
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integration because they see the autonomy gained through European integration as 
inadequate.98  ETA has continually planned attacks to coincide with prominent EU events, 
including summits99 and the constitutional referendum.100  Because of its ties to ETA and 
because it does not condemn ETA’s actions, Batasuna itself is classified as a terrorist 
organization, both within the EU and the US.101  The party was suspended for three years in 
2002 and declared illegal by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2003.  Any parties that are 
deemed to have close ties with Batasuna have also been punished.102  The European Court of 
Human rights upheld this ban in June 2009.103  Prior to the ban, Batasuna had one 
representative in the EP, two representatives in the Spanish Parliament (until 2000), ruled 
more than 60 local councils, and had 890 municipal advisors.104  Despite this, Batasuna was 
routinely excluded from any peace negotiations.  Banning Batasuna has been largely 
ineffective, since its members continue to voice their opinions and instruct their voters, and 
often infiltrate other parties to fulfill their objectives.105
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recently hinted at a willingness to abandon its support for ETA violence, but many see this as 
a Batasuna attempt to assert itself over ETA rather than a willingness to end the violence on 
principle.106
There are opposing views of whether European integration has proved positive or 
negative for the Basque region overall.  Interestingly, the support for both arguments comes 
from two specific concepts:  Spanish federalism and EU institutions.  Some argue that the 
institutions of the EU give areas like the Basque region a chance to correct any perceived 
inequality they feel within their member states. 
  Unlike Sinn Féin, Batasuna has made absolutely no shift in its views on the EU, 
does not see it as a forum to gain legitimacy or influence, and will likely not adjust this view 
anytime in the near future.  Because of this, the EU has had relatively little success regarding 
conflict management, resolution, or transformation concerning Batasuna.  
107  This argument is especially made with 
regard to Spain.  Under the federal structure of the state, autonomous communities have 
guaranteed representation in the Spanish senate, agreements for participation in Spanish 
delegations at the EU level, and forums in which to voice their opinion on EU matters 
relevant to their regions (General Commission for Autonomous Communities, sectoral 
conferences).108  EU institutions such as the Committee of the Regions allow for more EU-
level participation on the part of the Basque community, and the PNV and the Basque 
government have often taken an active role in such institutions.109
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has had delegations throughout Europe, including Brussels, since the 1930s.110  The PNV 
even claims to be represented in the EU and its bodies at the same level as member states.111  
Although against European integration, Batasuna also maintains an embassy in Brussels, and 
its presence has actually drawn more attention than the Basque government’s delegation.112  
With respect to this argument, however, many also contend that, although the EU has 
increased Basque influence, it still falls short of what Basque nationalists desire.113
Still, the Basque community has been extremely active at the EU level.  From 1999 to 
2002, Basque representatives attended more Commission committee meetings than any other 
Spanish autonomous community.  The Basque region was represented in 13 of the 55 
committees from 1998 to 2002 and in 14 of 95 committees from 2003 to 2006.  While 
remaining involved in affairs at the EU level, the Basque government remains critical of 
what it views as too limited a role for European regions at the EU level.
   
114  Given the PNV’s 
increasing isolation from the European mainstream, the legitimacy of the Basque voice at the 
EU level is decreasing.  In March 2009, for the first time in thirty years, the PNV lost control 
of the Basque regional government to the Socialists,115
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Others argue the opposite, saying that both Spanish federalism and EU institutions 
actually limit the power of autonomous regions in the Basque case, making the region further 
unsatisfied and intensifying its conflict with the Spanish government. They argue that the 
forums where the Basque government is given a voice in EU matters in Spain are still rather 
experimental and that the central government has a tendency to make decisions on its own 
without consulting the autonomous regions.116  In reality, then, structures of Spanish 
federalism that are designed to give the Basque community more voice in EU decision-
making are essentially creating more tension between the Basque region and central 
government, possibly because these forums are not being employed properly.  This then 
exacerbates the Basque region’s complaints.  Moreover, when Spain transfers sovereignty to 
the EU in certain issues, this diminishes the competencies of the regions.117  The Basque 
government wants to control implementation of EU policies within the Basque Country, but 
this is not always granted.118  The EU, however, maintains that regional matters such as 
competency over implementation and participation of regions at the EU level is a matter that 
falls within the jurisdiction of member states.  Some fear that the absence of an EU solution 
to the role of regions will further radicalize the nationalist movement.119
The most recent proposal from the Basque government, the Ibarretxe Plan of 2001, 
was a direct result of European integration.  The plan called for a semi-independent Basque 
entity loosely linked to Spain, but sharing co-sovereignty.  Since European integration 
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involves multiple points of sovereignty and identity, the Basque government was using the 
language of the EU to negotiate its own demands for concessions.  The Ibarretxe Plan shifted 
the focus from changing borders to changing the significance of borders.120   However, 
reflecting the division among nationalist politicians, the plan only passed the Basque regional 
parliament by a slim majority.  In 2005, the Spanish parliament forcefully rejected this plan 
as unconstitutional by a vote of 313 to 29.121  During debate over the plan in the Basque 
parliament, it became “increasingly evident that the European avenue is not a fruitful one,”122
Though evidence is mixed, on balance it appears likely that the voice that the EU 
gives to regions could help to ameliorate the conflict by giving parties a forum outside of 
Spain to discuss regional solutions.  The Basque government has criticisms of EU regional 
mechanisms, but it has still attempted to use them in order to further empower the region and 
transform the conflict, giving EU influence the potential for conflict transformation.  
However, growing disillusionment with a “Europe of the Regions,” the Batasuna hard line on 
European integration, the imperfections of Spanish federalism, and EU reluctance to weigh in 
on regional competencies all undermine this potential.  It is unlikely that regional 
mechanisms will provide a path for conflict management or resolution strategies since they 
would have to involve more overt action, which the EU is reluctant to take in this conflict. 
 
and nationalist parties began to move away from Europe due to a realization of the limits of a 
“Europe of the Regions.”  
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Integration has also resulted in a change in the nature of the nationalist movement 
overall.  Virtually all Basque nationalist organizations in Spain, including the PNV, began as 
ethnically and linguistically exclusive and the region was historically unfriendly to outsiders.  
Although the Basque region had been subject to waves of immigration before Spain’s 
accession to the EU, integration only heightened these flows.  Still today, ETA struggles 
internally as to whether it should continue to stress the ethnic dimension to its movement or 
downplay it in order to broaden its appeal.123
Economically, the Basque region was rather prosperous until the 1970s, when a 
number of factors caused a deep recession.  The violence that occurred during the time 
certainly did not help matters.  Before the recession, Basque per capita income was higher 
than most European averages, and significantly higher than the Spanish average.  The 
recession caused the Basque per capita income to fall below the European average.  It was 
not until the late 1990s that this gap was closed, and the Basque region closed this gap more 
rapidly than Spain as a whole.  The same is true for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.  
Unemployment remained a problem.
  Once again, integration is prompting a change 
of context for the conflict and causing involved parties to reevaluate their strategies, but this 
transformation may not work in favor of solving the conflict. 
124
Overall, there is little literature that directly links the Basque economy’s recovery 
with Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986.  There is, however, support for the argument that 
successful economic recovery was contingent on the level of violence occurring,
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also the result of switching from heavy industry and small family-owned businesses to a 
more service-based economy.126  EU accession opened up more opportunities for foreign 
trade, but thus far there is little literature that establishes an explicit link between any 
economic prosperity resulting from EU membership and decreasing levels of violence or 
radicalization.   In the future it is possible that the EU could be influential in the Basque 
region in matters of unemployment.  For example, the EU’s operational program for research 
and development in the Basque Country contributes a small amount to the region’s GDP 
(only 0.6 percent), but will create around 2,700 jobs.127  The region is still plagued by the 
exit of foreign investors as a result of ETA bribe threats made against them.128
Like Northern Ireland, Spain is also eligible for INTERREG program.  The Basque 
Country in particular benefits from three INTERREG programs:  the Atlantic area, southwest 
Europe, and Pyrenees programs.  The largest of these programs is the Pyrenees program, 
from which the Basque areas received €310.6 million between 1994 and 2006, and which is 
the only INTERREG program in the area that is specifically concerned with promoting and 
reinforcing regional identity.
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Basque authorities are well aware of the EU’s economic role in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland.  Indeed, ETA and the IRA and Batasuna and Sinn Féin had been in contact with each 
other repeatedly throughout the latter part of the twentieth century.  Basque leaders have 
continually been pushing for negotiations similar to those in Northern Ireland.130  Equally as 
important, they have sought funds similar to the EU peace funds in Northern Ireland, but the 
Commission argued that the comparison was unmerited; terrorism had done more damage in 
Northern Ireland and the economy there was more depressed overall than in the Basque 
Country.131
Economically, it would be difficult to argue that Spain’s membership in the EU has 
not helped País Vasco at all.  However, through its economic mechanisms, the EU has not 
really been able to achieve effects consistent with conflict solving literature.  Although 
providing a change of context economically, it is not clear that economic prosperity or EU 
economic programs have truly helped incentivize turning away from violence or helped to 
  At least two scenarios are a possibility here.  Basque leaders may just be 
petitioning the EU for money in ways that they think will be successful.  This is not 
impossible, but it is also not likely.  PEACE funds in Northern Ireland were just that – peace 
funds.  The EU only gave funds to Northern Ireland after the IRA declared and held a 
ceasefire.  In order for the Basque region to receive the same treatment, they would first need 
to convince ETA to declare and hold a new ceasefire.  Another possibility is that Basque 
leaders genuinely believe that EU programs and funding were making a difference in the 
Northern Ireland peace process and wanted the same for their region.  
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improve the conflict situation.  If anything, returned economic prosperity may embolden the 
region to further confront the central government. 
As with the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Basque conflict has a cross-border 
element.  The Basque provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya,132 and Navarra lie within 
Spain.  Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and Soule are all part of the southern French department 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques.  Batasuna is the only Basque party that wishes for complete 
independence of these areas from Spain and France.  The PNV is satisfied with autonomy 
within Spain, giving little consideration to unification with the French provinces.  Before 
European integration, the division of the Basque community between Spain and France 
resulted in a general lack of unity overall and lack of radicalization in France.133  The PNV, 
Batasuna, and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA, Basque Solidarity, which split from the PNV) had 
established French counterparts that still exist today, but these counterparts do not fully 
subscribe to the same platforms as the parties in Spain, and cross-border coordination 
between parties has waned.134  The major cross-border accomplishment of European 
integration thus far has been vastly improved cargo transportation networks.135
European integration, then, has proved to be somewhat of a double-edged sword.  On 
the one hand, it significantly advantages both the Spanish and French states, which are now 
able to cooperate on the capture and prosecution of ETA members in a manner that was not 
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possible before.136  At the same time, however, the free movement of people and increased 
levels of interaction could result in the radicalization of the Basques in France, but so far 
there is little evidence of this.  Prior to Spanish accession to the EU, a militant group arose in 
the French Basque Country and remained active from 1975 until the late 1980s, so an 
element of militancy predates Spain’s EU involvement.137  While European integration has 
reduced the significance of physical borders, those borders still seem to exist mentally 
between the Basque populations.  This is partially due to differences in socialization between 
Basques in Spain and France and also due to differences between the French and Spanish 
states regarding recognition of minorities and general state structure.138  Because of this, 
divisions between their Basque populations continue and cross-border exchanges remain 
asymmetric.139
As far as cross-border relations are concerned, EU influence has had negligible effect 
on the conflict along the lines of conflict solving strategy.  The EU has not had cross-border 
success like in Northern Ireland, probably due to the differing context of the conflicts.  On 
the positive side, EU cross-border efforts have not aided further radicalization thus far.  
   
Overall, EU influence in this case stands in stark contrast to that of Northern Ireland.  
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ethnic conflict.  The EU has had no effect in conflict management, refusing to mediate in 
negotiations.  Similarly, it has had no effect in conflict resolution, failing to satisfy the needs 
of the region or facilitate cooperation between Spain and País Vasco on the conflict.  Within 
conflict transformation, European regional mechanisms have some potential to transform the 
conflict, but this transformation has been undermined, and EU membership has not provided 
a meaningful change of context.  However, support for cultural and linguistic preservation 
and Basque self-government in Spain is still important.  An absence of any of these would 
cause the Basque community to feel further threatened.  Given differences between Basques 
in Spain and France and differences in state structures, European integration has not provided 
a meaningful change of context for cross-border co-ethnic interaction either, but has made it 
easier for Spain and France to cooperate against ETA. 
 
FYR MACEDONIA 
 Macedonia differs from the previous cases in two ways: 1) it is outside of the EU, and 
2) it is the only case to recently progress toward all-out war.  In this case study, I first sketch 
the EU role in the 2001 peace process.  Next, I evaluate the EU’s political influence in 
Macedonia, both influence gained through the peace process and influence gained through 
the EU accession process.  Finally, I turn to an analysis of EU economic assistance before 
examining EU influence on the cross-border situation in the conflict. 
In 2001, the National Liberation Army (NLA), an Albanian insurgent group, carried 
out a campaign against Macedonian security forces.140
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  Some have suggested that both 
Macedonians and Albanians fear that Macedonia’s leaders “may have willingly pulled their 
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country into the conflict to hide large-scale theft of state-owned enterprises and assets.”141  
The insurgency ended after the US and the EU, assuming a traditional conflict management 
role, stepped in to mediate a ceasefire in July 2001, culminating in the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement in August 2001.  The Ohrid Agreement called for constitutional and legislative 
reform to expand the rights and representation of minorities, particularly that of Albanians.  
In exchange, the NLA would completely disarm, its members receiving amnesty or leaving 
the country.142
Elites in Macedonia recognized the immense benefits of EU membership for 
Macedonia – and NATO membership was also valued, partly because it was seen as a 
stepping-stone to EU membership.  As a result, these elites were willing to cooperate with 
EU leaders in finding a solution – and were willing to give the EU an important role in 
enforcing any agreement.  However, the agreement did complicate political stabilization “by 
making Macedonia one of the last truly multi-ethnic states in the Balkans.”
  While the negotiations were a joint EU-US effort, the EU had the lead and 
remains the main international coordinator for Ohrid implementation.   
143
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As with the Northern Ireland process, not everyone was satisfied with this outcome, 
and NLA splinter groups have emerged.144  Few take note of the fact that the NLA itself was 
not involved in negotiations or a signatory to the Agreement.  Only ethnic Albanian political 
parties were signatories.145  However, the EU and US both understood that the Albanian 
parties were in contact with the NLA and NATO also had direct contact with the NLA.146  In 
reality, even without being party to negotiations, “the consequent engagement of the West 
bettered the NLA’s position domestically in far less time than legitimate political 
negotiations could.”147
These facts make the situation in Macedonia very fragile, and not all are happy with 
the results that have been produced.  In the September 2001 elections, the coalition in power 
during the insurgency and Ohrid negotiations was voted out of office.  Many citizens view 
the Ohrid Agreement with a general level of distrust and considered the election results to be 
a rejection of EU and US efforts.
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the compromises of the Ohrid Agreement to avoid a descent back into war.  It is now the 
ethnic Macedonians who feel threatened, worrying that Albanians are only concerned with 
their own freedoms and not the rights of other ethnic groups in Macedonia.  Albanians, 
overall supportive of the Agreement’s provisions, are dissatisfied with delays in 
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implementation.149  The Agreement has also been criticized as “[solving] the casus belli 
between the two leading groups, but… not [tackling] the ethnic problem at its roots,”150
Macedonia is also the only case considered here where external forces were brought 
in to safeguard peace agreements.  As a result of provisions in the Agreement, NATO 
deployed 3,500 troops to Macedonia for peacekeeping.  In March 2003, the EU took over this 
role, launching Operation Concordia, the EU’s first military mission.  EUPOL Proxima then 
replaced Operation Concordia in December 2003.
 a 
common criticism of third party conflict management.  However, it would be unfair to 
characterize the totality of EU influence in this way given the amount of minority rights 
mechanisms necessary for EU accession. 
151  The main goal of Proxima was police 
reform.  Proxima ended in December 2005, but the Council has remained involved in police 
reform in Macedonia.152
 The EU’s involvement in negotiating the Ohrid Agreement gave the EU political 
influence in Macedonia.  Indirectly, EU influence helped to create a new political party, the 
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), which quickly gained the support of Albanians in 
Macedonia.  Part of the Agreement stipulated that the NLA give up their armed struggle.  
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There had been other Albanian nationalist parties, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) 
and the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), prior to this.  The PDP had been part of a 
coalition government in Macedonia from 1992 to 1998; the DPA was also part from 1998 to 
2002.  The presence of Albanians in high levels of government was not a new development 
following the Ohrid Agreement.  The influence of the Albanian parties within these 
coalitions varied.153  Following the Ohrid Agreement, former NLA leader Ali Ahmeti 
envisioned the Albanian parties working together in a coordinating council.  The DPA tried 
to gain control of this council, and when that failed, it tried to undermine Ahmeti in whatever 
manner possible.  After this, Ahmeti formed the DUI.154  The DUI, as its name suggests, 
supports European integration.  In the 2002 elections, the DUI won 6 percent of the vote and 
was part of a coalition government with the Social Democrats.155  Following the 2006 
elections, the DUI, despite winning the most seats of any Albanian party, was left out of the 
coalition government in favor of the DPA.  In response, the DUI boycotted the legislature 
and implied that if democratic principles were not respected, a return to arms was possible.156  
Despite the fact that they have similar political agendas, the DUI and DPA continue to be 
fierce, and sometimes violent, rivals.157
                                                        
153Barany, Zoltan (2005) “Ethnic Mobilization in the Postcommunist Context:  Albanians in Macedonia and the 
East European Roma” in Ethnic Politics after Communism, edited by Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser.  
Ithaca:  Cornell University Press; 92. 
  Since ethnic Albanian parties existed and had some 
influence before the conflict, one could not argue that the EU newly empowered these 
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parties.  However, the EU did help to transform the conflict by changing the nature of its 
actors, specifically having a hand in turning the NLA from violence to politics. 
In addition to facilitating the NLA’s shift from violence to politics, the EU plays 
another crucial role in Macedonia, both politically and economically.  Overall, the 
Macedonian public is very supportive of European integration, with over 90 percent in 
favor.158  This support for integration has united Macedonians to work towards a “stable, 
prosperous, and wealthy Macedonia.”159  Just months before the Ohrid Agreement was 
signed, the EU and Macedonia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), 
which entered into force in April 2004.  Macedonia was granted EU candidate status in 2005, 
and in February 2008, the EU and Macedonia signed an Accession Partnership.160  The 
signing of the SAA is considered one of the crucial incentives for a peaceful resolution to the 
crisis during Ohrid negotiations.161  The DUI stresses the importance of the joint quest for 
EU membership by both Slavic and Albanian parties.  They feel membership would ensure 
the rights of Albanians and give the government as a whole more incentive for economic 
development and reform.162
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article-165530>. 
  In this way, in a conflict resolution sense, European integration 
encourages all Macedonians, regardless of ethnicity, to work together to make accession a 
success.  In a conflict transformation sense, it also provides ethnic Albanians with a sense of 
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recognition and freedom from fear that their rights will be violated.  Additionally, European 
integration provides a transformation of context, structures, and issues. 
 The EU is an incredibly important economic partner for Macedonia.  Since the SAA, 
EU countries account for 60 percent of total imports and 47 percent of total exports in 
Macedonia.  In 2007, the EU was responsible for 75 percent of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows into Macedonia, and FDI continues to increase year to year.163  Even before the 
insurgency, the EU provided important economic assistance.  From 1992 to 1996, Macedonia 
received €85 million as part of the PHARE Critical Aid Programme.  From 1996 to 1999, it 
received a further €105 million under the Multi-annual Indicative Programme.  Since 2001, 
EU-funded programs have increased in volume, totaling over €300 million, much of which 
was targeted specifically on minority issues and conflict management.  Overall, EU funding 
has been critical to the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, and the EU has often 
conditioned aid delivery on the content of constitutional amendments or other issues.164
Progress has been made, but there is still much progress to achieve.  Had the US and 
EU not stepped in and ended the conflict in 2001, Macedonia would not likely have been 
able to take the path it has toward European integration.  In addition to the openness of the 
Macedonian economy, EU conditionality has and will continue to contribute to economic, 
political, and social reform in Macedonia.
  By 
helping to fulfill Macedonia’s economic needs while still ensuring that minority needs are 
met, the EU is able to contribute to conflict resolution and transformation. 
165
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created “momentum toward market-oriented policies and institutions.”166  Conditionality 
helps apply pressure for reforms that would not have happened or would have taken much 
longer otherwise, but can also potentially create a sense of injustice when it touches upon 
sensitive matters.167  While regarded as a highly effective way to change the behavior of 
states towards minorities, it can also be difficult to assess whether conditionality is truly 
responsible for subsequent changes.168  Conditionality is one of the reasons that the EU 
cannot be considered a “powerless” third party.  At present, however, the incentive structure 
for both NATO and EU membership for Macedonia is undermined by the Greek veto 
regarding its dispute over Macedonia’s name.169
 While the EU has had significant impact in political, economic, and judicial reform in 
Macedonia, problems still remain.  The DUI was severely reprimanded at the EU level for its 
actions following the 2006 elections, and the EU has made clear that any similar actions 
could threaten Macedonia’s candidacy.
  
170  Elections in 2008 were also shrouded in 
controversy after violence broke out between followers of the DUI and the DPA.171
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harsh warnings from the EU following the 2008 elections, the 2009 elections passed without 
incident.172
 There are other potential sources of conflict as well.  The political environment in 
Macedonia is likely to change in the coming decades.  If current demographic trends in 
Macedonia hold, Albanians will become the majority ethnic group, possibly changing the 
dynamic of politics and ethnic relations in Macedonia.
  
173
 As with the other cases considered here, there is also a cross-border element in which 
the EU can have influence.  Although the origins of the NLA are somewhat unclear, during 
the 2001 insurgency, many members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) crossed the 
border into Macedonia to fight as part of the NLA.
  Within the accession process, the 
EU can have direct influence on the political and minority rights system in Macedonia.  Any 
setbacks in any of the reform areas of the EU acquis communitaire now have the potential to 
sideline Macedonia’s negotiations on EU membership. 
174  Some assert that Kosovo-Albanian 
leaders are now ready to sever ties with Macedonian Albanians if it will gain them favor on 
the international stage.  Regardless of whether or not this is true, in Macedonian politics, 
Kosovo remains a controversial and influential topic.  Arguments have been made both in 
favor and against the idea that the armed conflict in Macedonia was a domino effect or 
spillover from the Kosovo crisis.175
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opponents.176
Bulgaria is the main identity threat [to Macedonia] to the extent that identity is 
anchored in language; Serbs are the main identity threat to the extent that identity is 
anchored in religion; Albanians [are] the main identity threat to the extent that 
identity is anchored in statehood; and Greeks [are the main identity threat] to the 
extent that identity is anchored in the name of the nation, its language and state.
  In addition to these relationships, a number of other cross-border elements are 
important for Macedonia.  As scholar Zlatko Isakovic notes: 
177
 
 
Given previous and current EU activity in the Balkans, it will remain a crucial element in 
managing relations in the region. 
 Overall, out of any of my case studies, the EU has been able to achieve the most 
results in Macedonia.  The EU stepped in as a third party in negotiations, but is not a 
“powerless” third party.  Through its involvement in Ohrid negotiations and through the 
process of EU accession, the EU has tremendous influence in Macedonia.  The EU has been 
able to satisfy Macedonia’s economic needs while also securing rights for minorities and 
encouraging cross-community cooperation.  The full potential of the EU’s cross-border 
influence remains underdeveloped, but how the EU addresses cross-border politics in the 
future could significantly affect the situation in Macedonia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The case studies above have shown that the EU can have influence on ethnic conflict 
in Europe and that this influence can fit in with existing conflict solving theory.  In Northern 
Ireland, the EU has been able to foster constructive relationships between the UK and 
Ireland, between elites and cross-border social and economic networks, and between ethnic 
communities.  Through its structural funding in Northern Ireland, the EU has helped to 
alleviate economic needs and reduce economic discrimination.  European integration has 
produced a change of context for the conflict, giving rise to issues that have helped Sinn Féin 
distance itself from the IRA’s violent past. 
The picture from País Vasco is a bit bleaker.  Other than providing the Basques a 
voice at the EU level and supporting cultural and linguistic preservation, the EU seems to 
have affected the conflict little with respect to existing theory.  It has failed and even refused 
to facilitate cooperation between the Basque and Spanish governments and has not provided 
a meaningful change of context.  Regional mechanisms are available to the Basques, and they 
do make use of these mechanisms, but find them lacking overall.  The fragmentation of the 
nationalist movement and the continuing Batasuna hard line on EU legitimacy undermine 
potential EU influence on the conflict.   
In Macedonia, the EU stepped in as a conflict manager, chairing negotiations as a 
third party, but not necessarily a “powerless” one.  Through its economic assistance and 
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political conditionality, the EU has helped to fulfill the economic needs of both communities 
as well as securing rights for the Albanian minority and stressing the need for ethnic 
communities to work together toward EU accession.  Out of all of three cases, the EU can 
place the most direct pressure on Macedonia because of accession conditionality.  However, 
the cross-border situation is the most complicated in this case.  How the EU addresses current 
and future political debates in the Balkans will be crucial in determining its continued cross-
border influence in Macedonia.  
 What overall conclusions can be drawn from this?  Based on my research, I conclude 
two things.  First, as shown by the stark differences between the Northern Irish and Basque 
case studies, context will affect what role the EU can play and whether this role is consistent 
with existing conflict solving theory.  In Northern Ireland, the conflict is not just a case of 
conflict between nationalists and the British government, but also of nationalists against their 
fellow Northern Irish unionists.  In País Vasco, the conflict is different, primarily waged 
between the Basque region and the Spanish government.  Although different groups of 
Basque nationalists may disagree about tactics (violence v. politics) and end goals 
(independence v. increased autonomy), the region is relatively unified, especially when 
compared to Northern Ireland.  In addition to the absence of intra-regional ethnic conflict, 
differences in state structure also affect how the EU can influence the conflicts.  In the 
Basque case, the EU is very insistent of Spain’s sovereignty, much more so than it was in the 
Northern Irish case.  The fact that Batasuna remains so vehemently against the EU and has 
not shifted its approach like Sinn Féin also affects its influence in the Basque conflict.  Still, 
for all three cases, any wrong move by a nationalist party regarding ethnic violence or 
European issues can drive voters to their nationalist political competitors. 
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 Second, the differences between the case studies highlight the contrast in action 
inside and outside of the EU.  The EU would not take a direct mediating role in either 
Northern Ireland or País Vasco, stressing member state sovereignty as mentioned above.  
Outside of the EU, however, this does not seem to be much of an issue, since the EU stepped 
in to fulfill this role in Macedonia.  Additionally, the conditionality associated with EU 
accession will make EU influence more direct in candidate states than in member states. 
 This analysis also leaves opportunities for further research.  EU influence on ethnic 
conflict could be further evaluated by additional member state case studies where violence 
has not been the norm.  This would help to examine whether or not EU influence as 
described in this analysis can apply to non-violent ethnic conflict in member states.  In all 
three case studies, EU influence has primarily been a by-product of European integration or 
accession.  Other than that, the Macedonian case study, as noted above, was the only case 
where the EU has exerted direct influence with respect to the conflict.  Further case studies of 
EU influence on violent ethnic conflict outside of Europe would evaluate whether the EU 
will be able to have the same influence if EU membership is not a prospect for the country in 
question. 
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